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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (23 Apr 68)

FOR OT RD 681069

30 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH BATTALION 13TH ARTILLERY
APO 96368

AVCK-AA-0

1 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CFOR-65) (CIC-WENDAA) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I. (U) Significant Organization ~ Unit Activities.

1. (U) General: This battalion has supported Operation Pershing throughout the past quarter. The organic batteries have rendered support to the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 1st Air Cav Div (1 ACD). Generally the mission of this unit has been reinforcing the 1 ACD Division Artillery with a short period of time assuming the mission of direct support of Task Force 1/8 Cav, 1 ACD with A/2/19 becoming attached for OPCON to this unit. Btry A, 3d Bn, 13th Arty, formerly attached to the battalion, was detached from 41st Arty Group and attached to the 52d Group and further attached to 6th Bn, 14th Arty with the mission of GS 4th Infantry Division on 24 Nov 67. This unit assumed a mission of reinforcing the 1st Bn 77th Arty on 17 Jan 68 with responsibility for fire planning, targeting, and clearance of fires within the Northern half of the Pershing AO.

2. (U) Intelligence: a. During most of the reporting period the majority of intelligence received by this battalion was received in daily INTSUMs from 1 ACD, augmented by liaison between the battalion S2 section and 1st Bde 1 ACD, 1/9 Cav, MACV District Headquarters, 1 ACD Div Arty, and 40th ARVN Regiment. The S2 section developed a target list for the Northern portion of the AO during this period to prepare for contingency plans requiring this organization to assume a DS or similar mission. This list was of great value when the battalion did assume targeting responsibilities for the area.

b. During the latter part of December 1967 the battalion was provided an O1 aircraft on a daily basis for visual reconnaissance purposes; this was increased to two aircraft per day in January. This greatly increasing the battalion's ability to gather tactical information. The results of the air surveillance are incorporated into the intelligence cycle, and noteworthy targets identified are included in the interdiction fires or recorded for later use,

c. At this time the battalion has a Liaison Officer and four Forward Observers deployed with the 1st Bn, 50th (Moch) Infantry, an FO with the 2d Bn, 8th Cav, and one with the 2d Bn, 5th Cav. Intelligence is channeled to the battalion S2 section through these sources.

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3. (U) Operations and Training: a. The battalion remains under operational control of the 41st Arty Group. The mission has changed from reinforcing the 1 ACD Division Arty to reinforcing the 1/77 Arty with B/7/13 OPCON to 1/77 Arty. The battalion was subjected to 92 consecutive days of combat operations encountering no major difficulties.

b. Organic batteries of this battalion were engaged in a total of nine days of Administrative or Tactical Movements. No major difficulties were encountered. During the past quarter this battalion participated in one airmobile artillery raid in this area of operations. 1st Bn, 9th Air Cavalry Squadron provided security for the fire base, convoy air security and aerial reconnaissance over the target area. Firing units included 2 platoons of 105mm How (C/7/13) and a 155mm Howitzer platoon from B/1/30, which operated under the control of this battalion.

c. Personnel transitions continue to be a matter of grave concern to commanders at all echelons. To increase professionalism within the artillery and to insure safe transition into combat operations all newly arriving officers in this battalion are required to attend two formal courses of instruction presented under IFFV Arty auspices: Forward Observer Training Course and Fire Direction Officer Training Course.

d. Two batteries of this unit participated in one of the major battles in the Pershing AO to date when they supported ground elements in the Battle of Tam Quan, during the period 6 Dec to 13 Dec 67. The engagement started when a fire base manned by A/7/13 and 40th ARVN troops received a probing mortar and small arms attack. The attack was immediately repelled leaving 2 enemy KIA. During the first day of battle A and C Batteries were called on to fire at suspected enemy Command Posts. 1 ACD Air Recon Squadron checked the area and detected a radio antenna. They inserted troops who came under heavy SA and AW fire. US and ARVN reinforcements were rushed into the action which saw heavy action lasting 6 days. The two firing batteries of this unit fired almost continuously during the battle, expending 16,959 rounds. The entire engagement resulted in 647 enemy killed, 19 crew served weapons and 80 small arms captured.

e. Because of the large influx of enlisted personnel caused by rotations during Sep and Oct 1967, emphasis has been placed upon indoctrination and cross training. Airmobile operations have been stressed, with emphasis placed on rigging of equipment and techniques for air movement. Battalion SOP requires a minimum of one hour daily formal training for each section i.e. Firing Section, FDC, Mess, Maint, Survey, etc). This requirement is being met with weekly training reports submitted to battalion S-3.

f. The authorization to use APERS (Beehive) ammunition for a training vehicle has enabled the battalion to initiate demonstration firings to familiarize all personnel with the characteristics and effects of the round. This unit has been granted authority to fire one round per howitzer per quarter for training purposes.

g. The following is a chronological sequence of major events during the quarter to include the posture of the battalion at the beginning and end of the quarter:

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1 Nov 67: Hqs. 7/13 OPCON 41st Arty Group at LZ English with a mission of reinforcing 1 ACD Arty.
Btry A 7/13 at LZ Tom with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty.
Btry B 7/13 at LZ Pony with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty.
Btr. C 7/13 at LZ English with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty, with Quick Fire Channel to 1/77 Arty.
Btry A 3/18 attached 7/13 OPCON 52d Arty Group with a mission of GS 4th Inf Div Arty.

5 Nov 67: Btry B moved by road from LZ Pony to LZ Ollie; mission remained the same.

10 Nov 67: Btry C (-) moved by road to LZ Pony with a mission of reinforcing 1/77 Arty.

11 Nov 67: Btry C (-) returned to LZ English at 1800 hrs with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty, Quick Fire Channel to 1/77 Arty.
Btry B (-) was airlifted from LZ Ollie to LZ Walter closing at 1245 hrs.

12 Nov 67: Btry B (-) was airlifted back to Ollie closing at 1130 hrs.

13 Nov 67: Btry A was airlifted to LZ Mustang utilizing 9 sorties.
Battalion assumed the mission of Direct Support of Task Force 1/8 Cav, 1 ACD, effective 0200 hrs.
Btry A 2/19 became attached for Operational Control to 7/13 Arty with a mission of DS 1/8 Cav.

15 Nov 67: Btry B attached for OPCON to 1/77 Arty. However, logistical and administrative support is provided by this Hq.
15 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

16 Nov 67: 15 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

17 Nov 67: 0 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

18 Nov 67: 3 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

19 Nov 67: 10 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

20 Nov 67: 15 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

21 Nov 67: 8 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

22 Nov 67: 4 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

23 Nov 67: 8 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

24 Nov 67: Btry A, 3d Bn, 18th Arty detached 7th Bn, 13th Arty and 41st Arty Gp, attached 52d Arty Gp and further attached to 6th Bn, 14th Arty, with mission GS, 4th Inf Div.
4 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

25 Nov 67: 5 tons of supplies airlifted to Btry A.

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26 Nov 67: The mission of 7/13 Arty changed to GS 1st Cav Div. Btry B will reinforce 1/77 Arty (unwritten mission of DS 1/50 Inf (Mech)). C Btry mission is GSR 2/19 Arty with Quick Fire Channel to 1/77. A Btry 7/13 Arty was airlifted to LZ Tom from LZ Mustang with mission of GSR 2/19 Arty.

11 Dec 67: CI Team IFFORCEV Arty inspected all batteries of this battalion. Selected personnel of the CI Team inspected A Btry 7/13 Arty.

27 Dec 67: IFFORCEV Arty CG visited Bn Hq, B and C Btrys locations.

15 Jan 68: Btry C 7/13 Arty was airlifted to LZ Cannister on Arty Raid, returned same day.

17 Jan 68: ~~for reinforcing 1/77 Arty, with responsibility for targeting, fire planning, and fire clearances in northern half of Pershing AO, assuming responsibility for fire planning for one 8" battery, two 155mm batteries (one US and one ARVN), and five 105mm batteries (four US and one ARVN).~~
A and C 7th Bn 13th Arty reinforcing 1/77 Arty.
B/7/13 Arty OPCON 1/77 Arty.
A/2/19 Arty DS 1/8 Cav OPCON 7/13.
C/2/19 Arty DS 2/8 Cav OPCON 7/13.

20 Jan 68: A/2/19 and 1/8 Cav departed AO, 2/7 Cav moved into AO with A/1/21 Arty becoming OPCON 7th Bn 13th Arty.

23 Jan 68: Btry B moved from LZ Ollie by road to LZ Crystal with the same mission.

26 Jan 68: C/1/30 temporarily attached to this battalion.

Present Status: Hqs, 7/13 OPCON 1st Arty Group at LZ English with a mission of reinforcing 1/77 Arty and performing certain DS function in northern half of Pershing AO.
Btry A 7/13 at LZ Tom with a mission of reinforcing 1/77 Arty.
Btry B 7/13 at LZ Crystal with a status of OPCON 1/77 Arty, mission of reinforcing 1/77 Arty.
Btry C 7/13 at LZ English with a mission of reinforcing 1/77 Arty.
Btry C 1/30 at LZ Laramie temporarily attached 7/13 Arty.
Btry C 2/19 at LZ Geronimo mission of DS 2/8 Cav OPCON 7/13.
Btry A 1/21 at LZ Mustang OPCON 7/13 Arty.

h. Corps artillery battalion in a DS role. (Annex A)

4e (U) Logistics: There has been no change in the status of Logistical support for this battalion in the reporting period. Class I, III, and V supplies have been drawn through the 1st ACD forward support element. The main source for Class II and IV supplies is Qui Nhon Support Command Depot, however, limited amounts of these supplies may be drawn from the 1 ACD FSC to meet immediate demands. All classes of supplies are received in adequate quantities and in a timely manner.

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Motor Maintenance: 560th Maintenance Company continues to provide maintenance support for this battalion. Their stockage of repair parts are adequate for most repairs. However, a shortage still exists in batteries for $\frac{1}{4}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton and clutches for $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles. Deadline time for vehicles due to these parts has been as long as 120 days. Starters for $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicles is another major item that has been on requisition in excess of 30 days. Contact teams for the 560th Armament have reduced the deadline time considerably in armament, fire control equipment, individual and crew served weapons. 27th Maintenance provides support for M102 howitzers.

Signal Maintenance: a. Direct support for signal equipment is provided by the 556 Maintenance Company in Qui Nhon. There have been instances where RT-524's were in repair for periods of 45 days or longer. If a needed part is not on hand at least a 15 day period is required to secure part; also followup requisitions are submitted at 15 day intervals only. This greatly increases down time on FM equipment. This problem has been partially alleviated by location of a Field Maintenance Van at LZ English.

b. Of the authorized 60 PLL items, only 44 items are completely stocked, for a 77% fill. Fourteen items are presently at zero balance.

c. Supply of BA-30's is critical; an O2 requisition has produced negative results. Currently the majority of lighting equipment is "Jury Rigged" with other than BA-30's. Firing batteries are using other than BA-30's to power night sighting devices and aiming post lights.

5. (U) Civil Affairs: During the past quarter the Battalion Surgeon has conducted MEDCAP visits to two villages close to the battalion headquarters location on an average of once a week. Satisfactory results are being achieved and the villagers are responding more favorably to the program with more persons being treated each visit. Under the direction of the Battalion S-5 a building program has been activated. In one village material has been furnished to repair the local church. The progress has not been as satisfactory as it was hoped it would be. Just the opposite has been noted in another village where supplies and material have been furnished to build a needed dispensary. This project has progressed very rapidly and is almost completed.

SECTION 2. (U) Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

Part I Observations.

1. Personnel:

2. Item: Promotion Orders

Observation: Each battery was cutting promotion orders for grades through E4. Orders were not always in a standard format, effective dates sometimes varied between promotions of personnel between batteries, distribution was sometimes slow, and orders had to be emended because of erroneous information.

Observation: All promotion orders are now published at Battalion level, insuring proper distribution, standard format, greater ease in preparing reports and posting records, and correct information as verified by personnel records.

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b. Item: Payrolls for newly assigned personnel.

Discussion: Personnel were arriving, being sent direct to batteries, and waiting as long as 20 days for pay.

Observation: Personnel are processed completely at base camp, to include pay. Normal time between arrival and receiving pay is 3 days.

2. Operations:

a. Item: There was an accumulation of trash (fibers, boxes, and cannisters) and excess powder charges resulting from sustained heavy firing during the Battle of Tam Quan.

... the battery (i.e. Commo, Maintenance, Mess, and Ammo) were used to haul trash on a 24 hour basis. Night runs to the trash dump were frequent. Powder was placed in a covered amm trailer on the edge of the battery area and burned in the morning. During one evening when missions were of a nature as to last all night, trash trucks were placed between each platoon and trash was thrown directly onto the trucks. Cannisters were loaded throughout the night and convoyed to Ammo Supply Point as soon as roads were opened each morning.

b. Item: Maintenance of the piece.

Discussion: During blocking fire missions that sometimes lasted several hours, a close observation of fire control equipment, recoil, and lubrication must be maintained. It was not always feasible to inspect the piece thoroughly during these missions so loose mounts, oil leaks, rust, etc., must be suspected and watched closely. The range quadrant should be checked frequently with the gunner's quadrant to insure it is not loosening.

c. Item: Registration Lots.

... experienced extremely rapidly because of the large number of missions. Prior to this sustained fire period, we normally obtained a range check for our next largest lot whenever we registered. Since we eventually used all HE lots for close support fire, it became advisable to fire check rounds on all HE lots in the firing battery.

d. Item: Firing of Defensive Targets.

Discussion: Because of the large number of company size elements within our range an extremely large number of DT missions were called in. One evening we had nine companies call in to fire DT's; each of them had two or more grids. It is suggested when a large number of elements are in the area that they be instructed to fire in the grids they would most likely use and keep the remainder as on call missions. This would cut down on ammunition expenditures and more importantly, allow the missions to be completed earlier in the evening.

e. Item: Laying the Battery.

Discussion: Because many of the missions, especially the long blocking fires, were fired by platoons, we were sometimes often unable to lay the battery as a whole. As soon as possible after 0800 hours, the pieces were relaid by piece or platoon as the opportunity presented.

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Observation: The procedures prescribed by the Battalion SOP that held up well were the supervision by either the Chief of Section or the Gunner (acting as Chief of Section) and the system of checks. Naturally, during an extended period of sustained firing, personnel are going to get tired. This is when the Chiefs must be extra alert for errors or safety violations.

3. Others:

a. Item: Powder Pits.

Discussion: The practice of sinking square fuze cans for storage of unused powder increments was found to be inadequate. They are too small.

Observation: In one battery 55 gallon drums have been cut in half and sunk into the ground. Wooden covers painted red and marked "NO SMOKING-POWDER" have been constructed. Two other batteries have constructed pits 30" square and 24" deep.

b. Item: Emplacement of tarps and sand bags.

Discussion: The continuous firing of charge 6 and 7 causes sandbag walls to collapse and any loose edges of tarps to be pulled further and torn tarps result.

Observation: Additional sand bags are being put on all tarps covering ammunition bunkers and living quarters. Also, all parapet walls and ammunition bunkers are being constructed with additional sand bags, properly placed to prevent shifting.

c. Item: Cross Training.

Discussion: The previous "cross training" program in gun sections proved invaluable. By having all members of the firing sections capable of acting in any capacity during fire missions, more of the section members were able to go to rest as opportunities arose.

Observation: Cross training must be continued as new men join the sections.

d. Item: Connecting access roads to all guns.

Discussion: A route to all of the guns is needed for ammo resupply. When ammo trucks must be unloaded at a central location too much time is lost in preparing ammunition for firing.

Observation: It was noted that where trucks could unload at the howitzer section, the section was able to prepare for firing more rapidly.

e. Item: Protection against sapper attacks.

Discussion: At the end of the reporting period one man from the battalion was killed and three wounded when a perimeter bunker was attacked by sappers who also damaged five helicopters. The sappers entered the area by an unknown route, and apparently a satchel charge was thrown into the bunker nearest the helicopters at the time the first helicopter was attacked. The sappers then

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escaped by throwing a pallet over the concartina wire in front of the destroyed bunker. The satchel charge was probably thrown into the bunker from the rear.

Observations: Most emphasis has been placed on perimeter defenses, and perimeter guards were oriented almost completely toward the areas outside the perimeter. Bunkers must be constructed so as to provide all-around visibility and protection, and personnel must be alert to the fact that an attack can come from within the perimeter as well as from without. Critical installations such as helicopter parking areas must be protected by guards within the area as well as on the perimeter, and headquarters areas must have internal security forces on duty at all times.

Part II. Recommendations:

1. While it is necessary for a Corps Artillery battalion to be augmented with both communications equipment and personnel if it is to function properly in a DS role in Vietnam, it does not appear efficient for that augmentation to be held in readiness for such a contingency. In this instance, 41st Artillery Group (the next higher Artillery Headquarters) had determined what additional equipment would be required, and this was immediately made available to the battalion. As the need for additional personnel became apparent, these too were provided. Therefore I recommend that each artillery headquarters above the battalion level identify personnel and equipment which may be required if a subordinate unit assumes a more demanding or special mission, and makes plans to provide the additional resources.

2. Three of the firing batteries under the control of this headquarters are situated on air-supported positions. One H-13 helicopter has been made available to the battalion from the resources of the supported unit; another should be available within a few days. However, this will still not be adequate. A UH-1 (which has been requested by 41st Artillery Group) should also be made available to provide the lift needed to permit adequate staff supervision; resupply of items such as spare parts, generators, and other items too bulky or heavy for an H-13; transport of personnel from these batteries who must go to other areas on official business; and other necessary activities which cannot be programmed. Therefore I recommend that a battalion which has units on air-supported positions be provided with adequate helicopter support from the resources centralized at Force level.

Phil A. Hutcheson
PHILO A HUTCHESON
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

Next: A-Corps Artillery Battalion in a DS Role

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AVGK-CO (1 Feb 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (UIC-WFNDAA) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 41ST ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96368, 17 February 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

1. The Operational Report Lessons Learned for the 7th Battalion,
13th Artillery is approved and forwarded.

2. Reference: Section 2, part II par 1. The recommendation does
not appear to be feasible. Specific equipment and personnel cannot be
identified until the special mission requirements are known.

3. Reference: Section 2, part II par 2. Support for the battalion
as requested in cited paragraph is not available due to lack of assets.

Marl L. Welch
MARHL L. WELCH
LTC, Artillery
Acting Commander

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AVFA-AT-D (1 Feb 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (UIC-WFND.A) (U)

Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350, 5 March 1968

THRU: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT,
APO 96350

TO: Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Develop-
ment, Washington D.C., 20310

1. Concur with observations and recommendations contained in basic
communication and preceding indorsement.

2. Reference is made to Section I, paragraph 4c, page 5. BA-30
batteries are now a direct exchange item i.e., unserviceable batteries
are exchanged for serviceable items. This critical problem has been
alleviated. The S4, 41st Artillery Group has been advised of the new
procedures.

3. Reference is made to Part II, Section 2, paragraph 1, page 8
basic and paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement. Concur with the comment at
para 2, 1st Ind. The situation identified is a problem of internal
organization and will be monitored closely by this and group headquarters
to insure, when the tactical situation requires an organizational
modification of short duration, appropriate additional resources are
made available to the headquarters assigned the additional/modified
mission.

4. Reference is made to Part II, Section 2, paragraph 2, page 8
basic and paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement. This recommendation is re-
cognized as valid and is consistent with tactical requirements of the
battalion. The limited assets available to this headquarters are
scheduled and prorated to subordinate units as operational requirements
exist. Presently, two O1 observation aircraft are available to 7th Bat-
talion, 13th Artillery on a daily basis. However, lift capability is
unacceptable since only two UH-1 helicopters are available on a daily
basis to 41st Artillery Group, four battalions and one separate battery.
7th Battalion, 13th Artillery draws its aircraft support from 41st Artil-
lery Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DONALD L. BURTON
MAJ, Arty
Adjutant

AVFA-GC-OT (1 Feb 68)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WFNDAA 7th Bn, 13th Arty (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 16 MAR 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy Furnished:
IFFORCEV Arty


JAMES P. GASTON
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 68)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (UIC-WFNDAA) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, **20 MAR 1968**
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (FNDA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charles A. Byrd
CHARLES A. BYRD
Major, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:

HQ, 1 FFORCEV

HQ, 7th Bn, 13th Arty

GPOP-DT (1 Feb 68) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Bn, 13th Arty for Period Ending
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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Annex A: Corps Artillery Battalion in a DS Role

1. Organization of Operations/Intelligence Section.

a. Under current TO&E the S3 and S2 Sections cannot properly maintain or support the necessary targeting or fire planning to meet the required results of a Direct Support Battalion.

b. To meet this criteria this battalion consolidated the Operations and Intelligence Section under the control of the S3 with the S2 as assistant fire planning and targeting officer. In addition to the S3 and Operations Sergeant, the Battalion FDC must be augmented to a total of 12 EM and 2 Officers so as to be able to operate 24 hours a day. The fire planning/targeting section must have an S2, Asst S2 (Recon/Survey Off), Intelligence Sergeant, and two personnel for targeting.

2. Fire Planning.

a. To effect a complete and continuous fire plan with a minimum of interference with operations, the targeting personnel develop targets for the current Area of Operations. From this list, constantly being updated from intelligence sources available to the section, a target overlay is constructed.

b. There are many sources of intelligence available to the S2 for his targeting/fire planning. The daily Intsum from Brigade, Intsums from other FWMAF, IFFORCEV Intsum, and the PIR's are the printed sources available. The Liaison Officers with the supported maneuver elements are consulted daily as they spend most of their day flying over the AO and can provide information on the enemy activities and signs of enemy activity as provided to them by Forward Observers within the AO. The supported maneuver units are consulted at least twice a day and their spot reports obtained. The RTO's in Battalion FDC must be trained to copy all radio transmissions concerning contacts and activity within the AO and pass them to the S2. Forward Observers and firing battery personnel must also be trained to pass information to Battalion. Other units adjacent to and within the AO such as the ARVN's, NPFF, ROK's, Corps Engineers and Special Forces should be consulted daily. A radio should be placed on the local intelligence spot report net and if the DS battalion is in close proximity to the Brigade TOC, its targeting section should be consulted daily, as should the other Arty Bn S2's and operations section.

c. An order of battle book is extremely helpful in targeting as it gives the S2 a ready reference to enemy unit locations, size, movements, missions and habits. Strips of paper about three to three and a half inches by eight inches are helpful to record spot reports and pertinent information from Intsums, PIR report etc. The grid is placed in the upper left hand corner, the time and unit in the upper right hand corner, and the information is recorded on the remainder. These are handy for targeting and can also be used for intelligence briefings.

d. This target overlay is then placed over the firing capability and restriction overlay. Guidance from the S2 on patterns of enemy operations

Incl 1

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and from the S3 based on the current maneuver plan and also the desires of the battalion commander allows the targeting section to select the most promising planned targets in areas of desired concentrations. These targets are planned beginning at least 24 hours in advance, with current targets being added as dictated by observations from visual reconnaissance and latest intelligence reports.

e. A Trail/Stream Runner overlay is constructed, to determine probable targets for interdiction that are based on normal or predicted patterns of enemy movement, or areas of operations. The stream and Trail Runners are updated based on intelligence spot reports and visual reconnaissance reports.

f. The job of targeting is an important one in the DS battalion, (or
the Operations/Intelligence section) and the operations/intelligence section must be well organized and trained to accomplish it. The S2 must have a thorough knowledge of the enemy, his activities, and habits. He must also have knowledge of the friendly operations and planned operations. The S2 and S3 must work together closely. We have combined the operations and the intelligence section into an operations/intelligence section and have combined targeting and fireplanning into a single continuous operation. As targets are selected and analyzed the S2 will recommend the units and method of fire which is then approved by the S3 and finalized by the Battalion FDC into target lists.

3. Target Lists.

Upon completion of the selection of targets the fire plan is converted to a target list. The initial chart data is placed on each battery form for batteries that are organic, attached or OPCON to this organization prior to being distributed. This is done in order to reduce an excess amount of radio traffic required for chart data checks. Each battery is then required to check each target to insure data is correct. These appropriate lists are distributed to each firing battery and battalion headquarters of GSR units that fires are planned for, and copies of the complete fire plan and the planned expenditures by caliber are forwarded to the overall fire support coordinator. General areas of planned fires are presented to the Liaison Officers to enable them to advise the maneuver commander of the general area of planned fires and received and relay guidance to the S3 if additional fires are necessary. The Fire Support Coordinator briefs the separate Brigade or Task Force Commander on the daily fire plan.

4. The battalion in order to operate effectively required the augmentation of five additional RT 524 FM radios and four RC 292 antennas.

a. The Operations platoon headquarters to include FDC is authorized under the present 101 RT 524 FM radios.

b. The present operation requires 14 RT 524's; 8 within the FDC, two for relay to an air supported LZ and 4 for command and control vehicles (two for the battalion commanders vehicle, one in the executive officers vehicle and one on the S3's vehicle).

c. The radios required in FDC are for a CF net to all batteries, 3-firer nets, one net to the headquarters of the fire support coordinator, the

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artillery air advisory net, base defense net, and one radio for two nets either the MACV district advisors net for defense of highway one or a net for the MACV Advisors to the ARVN Regiment for their fire support. A VRC 24 (UHF) is required from outside the resources of this battalion for artillery air advisory for high performance aircraft.

5. Liaison Officers and Forward Observer parties with 1 ACD organic maneuver battalion are provided by the normal Direct Support Artillery Battalion. One separate maneuver battalion attached to the 1 ACD required one of this battalions authorized liaison parties along with 4 FO parties. Liaison with other FMAF must be provided this battalion. At present one liaison sergeant is provided the 40th ARVN Regiment. Two additional FO parties have been provided to 1 ACD maneuver battalions and one is now available to support the 40th ARVN Regiment.

6. Logistic capabilities have been taxed because of the different types and calibers of weapons supported and the requirement to support air supported Landing Zones. When the support units for the 1 ACD moved out they were required to take all the supporting equipment. This required this battalion to develop immediate contacts for items such as gas and water blivets, slings, cargo nets, donuts and clevis's.

a. As units were attached for the DS Role, transportation became a problem. To support the additional requirements vehicles were borrowed from organic and attached units.

b. Building materials became critical during this period. Needed items for bunker and firing emplacements such as beams, nails, lumber, cement and engineer stakes were not available through supply channels in the forward area.

c. Difficulty in administrative communication became a source of major concern. The primary and in most cases the only means of commo is radio. Tactical operations takes precedence but it became evident that many logistical problems had to be satisfied through this channel.

7. This battalion has been provided two O-1's and 2 H-13's for visual reconnaissance and command and control.

a. At this time the pilots are available for the two O-1 aircraft and two aerial observers have been assigned to provide the basic means for visual reconnaissance.

b. The H-13 support is presently two aircraft but only one pilot. The second pilot is to be provided in the next week. They are to be used for visual reconnaissance and command and control.

c. The above aircraft when all are flyable provide the necessary support of a visual reconnaissance program but is not enough to satisfy logistical administrative and command and control.

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